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CIVIL SOCIETY IN EARLY MING CHINA 
John W. Dardess 
Kansas University 
Zbigniew Rau defines civil society as "a space free from both family 
influence and state power". He goes on to remark that "[t]he absence of 
family influence and state power in civil society is expressed in its char-
acteristic features—individualism, the market, and pluralism/'1 Impor-
tant to the discussion here is his statement regarding the "precondition" 
for the creation of a civil society: 
The precondition for the existence of civil society is a normative 
consensus of its members. This consensus concerns the moral and 
social order that prevails among them. It concerns both the central 
moral values on which civil society is based and the rules of behavior 
of its members—who are to promote rather than hinder the en-
forcement of those rules. It is this normative consensus that ties 
together the members of civil society and makes them a moral 
community and a distinct entity that can then act as a whole.2 
Although Rau's definition and precondition are idealized, and do 
not easily admit the issue of historical change which I propose to trace 
here, the identifying labels he provides frame the topic serviceably, and 
point to what it is one should be looking for. There were indeed features 
that resembled the precondition for a "civil society" in early Ming China 
(from its foundation in the mid-14th century down to roughly the mid-
16th). Over time, its scope grew, then shrank (1368-1424), then grew 
again (after 1449). 
If "individualism, the market, and pluralism" are what result as "family 
1 Zbigniew Rau, ed. The Reemergence of Civil Society in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 4. 
2 Ibid., p. 6. 
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influence and state power" recede, then it would appear that by the 16th 
century, reasonable approximations to those conditions emerged—with 
economic growth and change (the "sprouts of capitalism"), and the de-
velopment of variety and complexity in the intellectual and religious 
life of China. And there is a great deal of earlier evidence, from the 14th 
century, that bears upon the issue of creating consensus about the "moral 
and social order", and the evidence shows that those most concerned 
with that issue were free of political or family coercion when at the 
outset they voiced their ideas. One difficulty over the use of the concept 
"civil society" in describing Ming China emerges from the fact that the 
existence of such a space, free from the constraints of state and family, 
was not itself cherished as an ideal, even though it was sometimes 
recognized in fact—as "the wilderness" (yeh i f) , in counterpoint to "the 
court", the sphere of government (ch'ao §9). In Ming China, the ideal 
was that state and family should themselves so effectively embody the 
normative moral consensus of the realm that an autonomous "civil soci-
ety" would scarcely be necessary, and might indeed pose a threat, as a 
source of antinomy and disorder. 
Creating a "Normative Consensus" in the 1350s and 60s 
In the middle decades of the 14th century, natural disasters, popular 
millenarian uprisings, the slow collapse of the Yuan dynasty, and the 
rise of local and regional warlords, reduced China from a prosperous 
and peaceful society to a condition of catastrophic ruin. Virtually all 
thinking men who pondered the causes of such calamity identified them-
selves as "Confucians" (shih ± o r ju JSf). A Confucian was thought to be 
anyone of education who was trained in the Confucian texts, and who 
sought ways to apply what was in those texts to the improvement of the 
world. Although not everyone agreed on interpretation, the texts together 
provided normative guides to all of civilized life: from the ethical psy-
chology of the individual, to the social forms into which each individual 
must fit, to the nature and purpose of political systems. As learned 
"experts" who were especially knowledgeable in such matters, Confu-
cians occupied a special social niche, far enough removed from family 
and state constraints to allow them to deliberate upon family and state 
formation, and to critique their practices. Their diagnosis of the national 
calamity of the mid-14th century identified Yuan bureaucratic corruption, 
and the failure of the throne to purge that corruption, as the fundamental 
cause. 
Only a few Confucians ventured to define the next step, but their 
influence on the early Ming order was crucial. Sung Lien and the other 
formulators of the original Ming agenda lived at home in eastern Chekiang 
province in the early 1360s, witnesses to the anarchy; there they worked 
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out their ideas for the reconstruction of China, under the stress of civil 
disorder to be sure, but under no political coercion whatever. 
Sung Lien and the others constituted the leading edge of a national 
Confucian intelligentsia. I have argued elsewhere that they were more 
than just an intelligentsia, and much like leaders of a militant professional 
movement, in that, based on their reading of the orthodox texts, they 
claimed to know what a good society should look like, and they wrote 
and spoke in behalf of a Confucian community generally, whose role, 
they asserted, was to serve the needs of society (as advisors, officials, or 
teachers) in the light of the norms and methods they elaborated. The 
militant professionalism of those Confucians was so strongly asserted, 
because what was at stake was the very validity of Confucianism itself, 
as contrasted to ad hoc solution-making by wardlords and regionalists 
and other patently self-interested elements competing for territory and 
power in China.3 
It is also possible to see in the militant Chekiang Confucianists of the 
1350s and 60s something of the revolutionary, world-remaking impulses 
of Puritans or Jacobins. Those Confucianists saw China in its turmoil as 
a society in an acute stage of an awful disease; a mass of people so bent 
upon mindless self-destruction that nothing short of a total ethical re-
making of their minds would save it. They insisted that a new state 
must use all means to foster a new people who were imbued with 
altruism. By the same token, a new state must relentlessly repress all 
bearers of the viruses of China's present national sickness—the hypocrites, 
the villains, the greedy, the ambitious, the purely self-seeking. The writers 
specified the goals of this new order, the central role of the ruler in it, 
and the function of the Confucian community as his source of advisors 
and officials. They extended the ruler a free grant of discretionary power 
to restore peace and order, refashion the national moral order, and save 
the realm from its self-inflicted ills. 
As it happened, ex-peasant Chu Yuan-chang, an out-of-control re-
gional general nominally in the service of a millenarian rebel emperor, 
appeared in the midst of these writers in 1360, and he took them on as 
his advisors. Chu was boundlessly energetic, and ruthless. He was also 
teachable. Eight years later, Chu reunified China and founded the Ming 
dynasty. (Edward Dreyer has argued that other outcomes were more 
likely; that the Ming unification owes a great deal to pure contingency, 
a series of very lucky breaks.4 Chu Yuan-chang interpreted his own 
good luck as signs of Heaven's favor). 
Chu Yuan-chang (Ming T'ai-tsu, r. 1368-98) carried out the Confucian 
program for the regeneration of China with fidelity and vigor. Power 
3 Confucianism and Autocracy (Berkeley, 1983). 
4 Early Ming China. A Political History, 1355-1435 (Stanford, 1982). 
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was recentralized in the hands of the monarch, and the monarch was 
given carte blanche to purge national administration of the corruption 
believed to have been responsible for the Yuan collapse. The Confucian 
advisors, even before they had made common cause with the Ming 
dynasty, had discussed the problem that there was no way for the Con-
fucian community itself, which lacked formal organization, to prune its 
own ranks of incompetents, corrupt hypocrites, and self-interested place-
seekers. Only an emperor could do that, by using the police powers of 
the state, in the light of his own ultimate insights into the dispositions 
for good or evil in men's minds. It was T'ai-tsu's Confucian advisors 
who thus helped create a routinized paranoia about people's true inten-
tions; and that attitude, as adopted by T'ai-tsu, fueled the terrible waves 
of purges that over a period of thirty years claimed many thousands of 
victims, many if not most of them innocent. 
This was the perhaps inevitable downside of any national program 
of ethical revitalization, conducted (as this one was) with fierce determi-
nation, and with no concern for procedural safeguards. In the circum-
stances, "civil society"—in the form of an independent critical voice 
with regard to the direction national policy had taken—all but disap-
peared. Only a handful of dissenters dared make open protests; and the 
ruler, suspicious of their real intentions, dealt harshly with some and 
ignored the others. Sustained and reasoned resistance to the founder's 
"line" therefore developed underground, and came out into the open 
only upon the succession of T'ai-tsu's grandson, the Chien-wen emperor 
(r. 1398-1402). 
The leader of the resistance was Fang Hsiao-ju (1357-1402), who rep-
resented a new Confucian generation that lacked its predecessor's expe-
rience of civil war and chaos. Fang's father had been a victim of one of 
the founder's indiscriminate purges. Through word-of-mouth recom-
mendations, careful introductions, and letter-writing, Fang Hsiao-ju put 
together a small clique of like-minded and serious junior Confucian 
revisionists in the 1380s and 90s, and worked out a bold and comprehen-
sive plan for the reorganization of China, based on stable institution-
building as a replacement for the founder's increasingly self-defeating 
methods of purge and penal terror. In an action much discussed in 
higher Confucian circles, the older informal leadership of the Confucian 
community, in the person of Sung Lien (who tacitly backed away from 
his earlier views), acting in a non-official capacity as a teacher and 
writer, passed to Fang Hsiao-ju a symbolic tablet, and named him his 
successor as "exemplar" (tsung of the next Confucian generation. 
Thus even in the dark and repressive later years of the Ming founder's 
reign, there managed to survive a precarious open space, "free from 
both family influence and state power", where a few men discussed and 
formulated plans that bore upon issues affecting the very foundations 
of China's "moral and social order". The Ming founder had twice inter-
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viewed Fang Hsiao-ju, but it seems he learned nothing about Fang's 
counterrevolutionary ideas and his network-building activities. 
In the early Ming, then, there existed the idea of a national Confucian 
community, professional in its pretensions to national service, which, 
while it participated in government, was also an entity quite separate 
from it, with an informal recruiting and ranking system of its own, and 
here and there small circles where men formulated national purposes. 
That kind of Confucianism ended with an awful and bloody finality 
in Nanking in the summer of 1402. The army of the Prince of Yen (soon 
to be the Yung-lo emperor) entered the city after a civil war and put an 
end to the Chien-wen regime. Fang Hsiao-ju and many of his circle 
were slaughtered. Others committed suicide. Mention of Fang, or pos-
session of his writings, was punishable by death for as long as a century 
thereafter. 
Civil Society in Eclipse, 1402-1449 
The Yung-lo emperor commanded enough power and authority to 
set his own national priorities. Under his command and rule (1402-24), 
the Ming state proceeded to incorporate Confucianism by deepening 
the government school system; establishing an orthodox curriculum of 
study for those schools; and making the civil service examination system 
the leading mechanism for recruiting the best and brightest from the 
schools into government service. 
For roughly half a century, there was scarcely any social space, outside 
the bounds of state control, in which an independent intelligentsia might 
operate. (In 1449 came a major turning-point, when a disastrous military 
campaign led by the young and wayward Cheng-t'ung emperor signalled 
what turned out to be a permanent downgrading of the leadership and 
prestige of the Ming throne. A freer intellectual atmosphere was one of 
the consequences). 
The Yung-lo emperor, soon to be the proud sponsor of a state-
sanctioned Confucian orthodoxy, issued an early and effective warning 
to independent scholars. In 1404, one Chu Chi-yu submitted the results 
of his creative research into the Confucian classics to the court, clearly 
expecting some sort of commendation. Instead, the emperor and his 
advisors decided to make a negative example of him to the realm. Chu 
Chi-yu "slandered the Sages and Worthies" and "contradicted" Chu 
Hsi and the other Sung Neo-Confucian fathers. Armed guards escorted 
the luckless Chu Chi-yu back to his home. Local officials gathered the 
literati and students and conducted a public criticism session. Police 
searched Chu Chi-yu's house, seized all his writings, and destroyed 
them. Chu was flogged a hundred times. He was forbidden to call 
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himself a Confucian (ju) or ever to teach anyone again.5 
The repression of Chu Chi-yu had the intended effect: just a few 
severely shrunken islands of free social space survived in the China of 
the first half of the 15th century. Best known is that which formed 
around the modest rural home of Wu Yti-pi (1392-1469), in northeastern 
Kiangsi. As a young man, Wu could have exploited his father's connec-
tions to make a career for himself in government, but something deterred 
him, perhaps the events in Nanking in the summer of 1402, something 
of which he may have witnessed as a child of ten. At the age of seventeen, 
he left his father and returned hime to Kiangsi to manage his family's 
smallholding, living and dressing as a peasant while pursuing according 
to his own lights what he considered the true path of Confucianism to 
be. 
Several things bear noting here. The first is that Wu Yii-pi couched 
his program of self-tuition entirely within the scope of "orthodox" Ch'eng-
Chu Neo-Confucianism, as recently sanctioned by the Yung-lo govern-
ment. Thus he could not be accused of heresy. The second is that he 
showed no interest in China's history or institutions, no interest in current 
issues, no interest in large-scale questions of national sociomoral order 
or the future of China, matters that had obsessed Sung Lien and Fang 
Hsiao-ju. Wu's obsession was, instead, singularly targeted upon his own 
individual psychic reconstruction, the achievement of sagehood, in con-
junction with (rather than as an escape from) the labor, the discomforts, 
and the irritations of life at the everyday level of a working commoner. 
The constraining effect of the Chu Chi-yu case upon Wu Yu-pi's choices 
is quite apparent. 
Word of Wu Yu-pi's efforts at self-reorganization through Neo-
Confucian reflection spread, and disciples came to him, a few at a time. 
Wu Yii-pi was surely fearful of a government crackdown if too many 
came, which seems to be in part why he was so extremely demanding, 
and affected an air of ill-humor. At some point he gave the job of screening 
and teaching new followers to an aide, Hu Chiu-shao, who joined him 
very early, perhaps as early as 1421.6 
Some of those who came to study with Wu Yii-pi were disillusioned 
dropouts from the state examination system. Hsieh Fu (1441-1505) was 
at a very young age disturbed by the discrepancy between the ethical 
idealism of orthodox Neo-Confucianism, and the real-world demands 
of the examination system and official life, and so, "when he heard [Wu 
Yu-pi] was discussing the Confucian Way at Hsiao-p'o, he abandoned 
the exams and travelled [about 175 miles south from his home] to follow 
him as a student. Everything he was taught he internalized in his mind, 
5 Tan Ch'ien, Kuo ch'ueh (reprint Beijing, 1958), 1.937; Ming shih-lu, 10.581. 
6 Yang Hsi-min, ed., Shih-wu-chia nien-p'u (reprint Taipei, 1966), vol. 4, p. 1526. 
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and energetically put it into practice, seeking thereby to 'acquire it for 
himself'. Over a period of three years he didn't slacken in the least. Wu 
said of him happily: 'There is hope for our Way!"77 
Cheng K'ang, after failing several times to achieve his provincial 
degree, quit to become a truth-seeker at the rather advanced age of 
thirty. "Tlie regimen here can't be absorbed in a short time," said Wu, 
when Cheng K'ang appeared before him. "You've made a mistake to 
come so far." "This mind of mine has been dispersed a long time," 
replied Cheng, "and I'm just a little late in seeking you out. I don't dare 
look for quick results." Cheng submitted to Wu's stern regimen, and 
after having "learned something" of the essentials, returned home again 
to a private life of study and teaching.8 
Then there was Ch'en Chen-sheng (1410-73), a would-be disciple of 
Wu. Born into a military community on the south China coast, Ch'en 
early on resolved to make something of himself. He tried the examinations, 
but discourteous treatment on the part of the officials in charge caused 
him to quit in shock and disgust at the age of 34. Entirely on his own, he 
then sought out some key or recipe to the psychic makeup of the Confucian 
sages, a transcendant mental state where all unwanted thoughts (k'o-nien 
were stilled, and one undertook no action prompted solely by 
external inducements (wai-yu ^ t f ). As with Wu Yu-pi, Ch'en's method 
for achieving this state of mind was to link together clues from the 
state-sanctioned texts of Confucian orthodoxy in such fashion as to make 
psychic self-realignment possible as a regimen, and its results visible in 
one's actions. 
By 1459, the earlier climate of intellectual repression had lifted some-
what. Ch'en Chen-sheng thought the time had come to share his thoughts 
with the world. In 1459, he broke free of the constraints of "civil society" 
(a concept he had never heard of) and came to Peking to talk to the 
emperor and give him a tract he had written, called "Epitome of the 
Ch'eng-Chu Orthodoxy". The emperor (who a year earlier had tried 
without success to get Wu Yu-pi to accept a position as tutor to the heir 
apparent) declined to see Ch'en. The tract, sent to the Ministry of Rites 
for their consideration, died there without comment from the officials. 
Ch'en also sent a copy to the heir apparent, the future Ch'eng-hua em-
peror, then twelve years old. Ch'en then returned home, where he urged 
the authorities to make the civil service examinations conform more 
closely to Confucian orthodoxy. Then, having heard of Wu Yu-pi, and 
wishing to put some questions to him, he sold his property and again 
took to the road, accompanied only by a nephew. "If I die," he instructed 
his nephew, "just bury me by the roadside and label my tomb 'Tomb of 
7 Chiao Hung, éd., Kuo-ch'ao hsien-cheng lu (reprint Taipei, 1965), 114.29ab. 
8 Ibid., 114.36ab. 
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Ch'en X of Fukien, a hemp-wearing commoner/" 
It appears that Wu Yii-pi may have refused to see Ch'en. Somewhere 
in Kiangsi, Ch'en chanced to stop at an inn where Chang Yuan-chen 
(1437-1507) was also staying. A Han-lin Junior Compiler, Chang resigned 
his position around 1465 owing to differences with higher administration, 
and was probably embarked upon his "twenty years of intensive home 
study of Neo-Confucian metaphysics" at the time Ch'en met him and 
shared his ideas with him. "I must say," said Chang, "that you're the 
first man since the time of Ch'eng and Chu themselves to grasp the 
truth. Neither Wu nor Hsu [Wu Ch'eng and Hsu Heng?] ever got as far 
as you have. You can't [see] Wu Yu-pi, but you don't need to see him." 
Thus flattered and advised, Ch'en returned home, where he became a 
local influence on behalf of Confucian orthodoxy, remembered and hon-
ored there long after his death.9 
The aim of Ch'en Chen-sheng and Wu Yu-pi was to work out privately 
a practicable method of ethical self-development, based entirely on the 
state-approved Confucian orthodoxy. Although Wu Yû-pi had no known 
political or social objectives, it appears that finding social space free of 
the demands and restrictions of government (though not of the require-
ments of daily life) was essential to his method. He dressed as a peasant, 
not as a scholar or member of the gentry (and when he showed up in 
Peking in 1458 wearing a palm-fiber hat such as peasants wore, Han-lin 
Junior Compiler Yin Chih was irritated and asked an aide of Wu's: 
"Scholars don't wear palm-fiber hats. Why does Master Wu have one 
on?" "It's just to keep off the sun," replied the aide).10 One imagines Wu 
Yii-pi and his small following of disciples at home, looking for all the 
world like common peasants grubbing at chores, while absorbed in 
their psychic self-disciplines. This was China's major center for "civil 
society", and this is how spatially cramped and intellectually constricted 
things must have appeared. But Wu Yu-pi lived long enough to see 
things loosen, and he became by the time he died in 1469 a true national 
celebrity, vilified by some, and admired by many. 
The Rise of a New Moral Community 
Traditional sources label Hu Chiu-shao, Hsieh Fu, and Cheng K'ang 
as "second-tier disciples" of Wu Yii-pi, men who suffered the limitations 
of the repressive conditions of the early 15th century. They list as "first-tier 
9 Ibid., 114.33a-35b; Ch'en Chen-sheng, Ch'en Cheng-fu hsien-sheng chi (Cheng-i t'ang 
ch'ûan-shu éd.), 4.1a-5a; W. T. de Bary, The Message of the Mind in Neo-Confucianism 
(Columbia, 1989), pp. 68-71,192. 
10 Yin Chih, Chien-chai so-chui lu (Li-tai hsiao-shih ed.), 23a. 
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disciples" Lou Liang (1422-91), Ch'en Hsien-chang (1428-1500), and Hu 
Chii-jen (1434-84). These were men of a younger generation, who joined 
Wu around 1454, soon became very well known in their own right, and 
had strong influences upon the development of a new Ming intelligentsia 
that increasingly found room to function outside the framework of the 
state and its orthodoxy. Lou Liang was an important teacher of Wang 
Yang-ming (1472-1529). Ch'en Hsien-chang preceded Wang Yang-ming 
in making a major break with the Ch'eng-Chu orthodoxy. Hu Chu-jen 
had an early hand in the revival of the academies (shu-yuan Hfl?*:) as 
extra-governmental centers of philosophical discussion all over China. 
None of these disciples was an office-holder. 
By the early decades of the 16th century, the social space for forming 
a "moral community" expanded to comprise large numbers of officials, 
on active duty or retired, as its leadership. One has in mind such figures 
as Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529), Chan Jo-shui (1466-1560), Ou-yang Te 
(1496-1554), and others too numerous to mention here. Though typically 
led by men in government, the Confucian community of the 16th century 
was not an outgrowth of government in any immediate sense; it was 
was a product of personal commitment and individual initiative on the 
part of people whose official positions afforded them prestige and visi-
bility, but did not compel their behavior. 
Unlike Wu Yii-pi, Wang Yang-ming was a charismatic figure who 
was able and eager to reach out to welcome a wide followership, especially 
among the growing population of government students, and younger 
men just beginning their bureaucratic careers. He taught unofficially 
even while busy with government work. He frequently took part in 
informal philosophical meetings and discussions. There is testimony 
(biographies of many of his followers) that to come to see life through 
the subjective Confucian lens that Wang devised was to undergo some-
thing akin to a religious awakening. Much of south China flocked enthu-
siastically to his banner. Wang's philosophy retained its vitality for a 
half-century, from his death in 1529 down to Grand Secretary Chang 
Chii-cheng's suppression of the academies and philosophical discussion 
in the 1570s.11 It was propagated in a distinctly collégial style, emphasizing 
group interaction, rather than the strongly asymmetrical master-disciple 
hierarchies common to orthodox Neo-Confucianism. 
Wang Yang-ming's breakthrough to the formation of a wide new 
public conscience, or "moral community", helped to open floodgates 
that he probably did not anticipate, and certainly could not control. 
Down in Fukien, failed student Lin Chao-en (1517-98) founded a large 
new religious sect based upon an amalgam of Confucianism with Bud-
11 John Meskill, Academies in Ming China. A Historical Essay (Tucson, 1982). 
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dhism and Taoism.12 In Yang-chou, former saltworker Wang Ken (1483-
1541) took to the streets preaching the promise of Confucian sagehood 
to all who would listen. Ho Hsin-yin (1517-79), willing "to place loyalty 
to friends above one's obligations to state and family", travelled all over 
China building a network of assemblies for a national society of "friends", 
a breathtakingly visionary project in the social re-engineering of the 
country (with the idea, perhaps, of creating something very close to a 
"civil society"), a project which ended in his death in prison on charges 
of sedition.13 
Expressing Dissent 
It is difficult for a "moral community" concerned to build consensus 
about "the moral and social order" categorically to exclude the question 
of political power from its agenda. Indeed, the world-remaking Confucian 
intellectuals of the mid-14th century occupied themselves exactly with 
the question of how to use state power to remold the moral and social 
order of China. To be sure, later on, Wu Yii-pi was forced to go to 
extreme lengths to exile himself from government and the "gentry" 
class, and develop an ethical agenda that was as much as possible apo-
litical. The Wang Yang-ming "consensus" was fundamentally ethical 
too, but it was also strongly collégial; and far from escaping the state, 
Wang and many of his followers participated in it, and from time to 
time they (and others as well) confronted it openly—by way of dissent 
and protest. 
The metaphorical channel for dissent and protest was the so-called 
"avenue of speech" (yen-lu "sfê), built into the Ming state from its 
beginning, as a means whereby vital information and admonition might 
reach the ruler unimpeded by bureaucratic entanglements. (Notes for a 
very interesting history of the changing uses of the avenue of speech in 
the Ming were written by Chao I, in the 18th century).14 As the power of 
the throne and its moral primacy waned after 1449, the avenue of speech 
came to serve more and more as a channel through which officials, 
acting as the self-styled moral conscience of the realm, "struggled to the 
death" (ssu-cheng to make their opinions in ethical-ritual matters 
prevail over the will of the emperor or his principal surrogates. 
This led on occasion to bureaucratic "strikes". In 1468, the civil and 
12 Judith Berling, The Syncretic Religion of Lin Chao-en (Columbia, 1980). 
13 Wu Pei-yi and Julia Ching, "Ho Hsin-yin", in L. C. Goodrich and Chaoying Fang, 
eds., Dictionary of Ming Biography (Columbia, 1976), vol. 1, p. 515. Also Hou Wai-lu, 
Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang t'ung-shih (Peking, 1960), vol. 4, part 2, pp. 1003-30. 
14 Chao l,Nien-erh-shih cha-chi (reprint Taipei, 1958), vol. 1, pp. 506-8. 
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military bureaucrats, almost to a man, staged a kneeling demonstration 
at the Wen-hua gate inside the Forbidden City, and succeeded in getting 
the Ch'eng-hua emperor to yield to them in a ritual matter. The issue at 
hand (recognizably a "constitutional" issue, in the American sense) was 
whether the emperor's birth-mother had the right to order her son to 
violate the correctly expressed will of his deceased father with regard to 
how his principal consort should be buried. In 1519, a major demonstration 
on the part of much of Peking officialdom succeeded, despite blood, 
imprisonment, torture, and death, in forcing the Cheng-te emperor to 
postpone an ill-advised and dangerous tour of south China. In 1524, 
another bureaucratic "general strike" was mounted, this time unsuccess-
fully, and again at the cost of much suffering and death, to force the 
Chia-ching emperor ritually to disown his own father, and make himself 
son by adoption of the Hung-chih emperor, whose line had become 
extinct (at issue here was whether the state system and the private 
system of ancestral order were two separate things, or one).15 
Conclusion: The Early Ming and "Civil Society" 
The facts would appear to show that China in the 14th-16th centuries 
satisfied fairly well Rau's "precondition for the existence of civil society". 
The indications are (1) that there was a good deal of consensus about the 
moral and social order, and about central moral values, and that (2) this 
consensus, broadly speaking, was achieved by intellectuals and scholar-
officials acting for the most part independently of state and family. It 
has been recently emphasized that Confucianism on the whole required 
that each individual must discover moral truth for himself.16 Even the 
official Ch'eng-Chu orthodoxy as sanctioned by the early Ming state 
had to concede the fundamental legitimacy of the individual quest for 
ethical self-perfection to such men as Wu Yii-pi and Ch'en Chen-sheng. 
But somehow the "precondition" resolved itself otherwise than in 
the formation of a full-blown "civil society". For that, there appear to be 
at least two principal reasons. The first reason is that the quest for moral 
truth was not open-ended, because moral truth, though elusive, was 
15 These incidents are discussed in much more detail in Dardess, "Ming Officials and 
Modern Intellectuals: Some Enduring Configurations of Moral-Political Protest in Chi-
na", paper for the research conference "The Continuing Relevance of Traditional Insti-
tutions and Values in the Context of Modern China", East-WestCenter, University of 
Hawaii, May 1993. 
16 For example, Wm. Theodore de Bary, Learning for One's Self Essays on the Individual 
in Neo-Confucian Thought (Columbia, 1991); Thomas A. Metzger, "Confucian Thought 
and the Modern Chinese Quest for Moral Autonomy", in Silke Krieger and Rolf Trauzet-
tel, eds., Confucianism and the Modernization of China (Mainz, 1991), pp. 266-306. 
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definable (definably Confucian); and it was construed not narrowly but 
universally, such that ultimately it was impossible to conceive of throne, 
officialdom, and family as institutions that ought to be considered quite 
separately from the question of the moral autonomy of the individual, 
and from the "moral and social order" generally. 
A second reason why a fully-developed notion of civil society did 
not develop can be seen in the actual working of the yen-lu, the "avenue 
of speech". The opinion that was forwarded upward through the yen-lu 
was commonly called "public opinion" (kung-lun fi-fi), but unless the 
opinion being expressed was completely correct, wholly impartial, and 
totally sincere, then it was not public opinion at all, but self-serving and 
villainous deceit, which no one had any right to voice. Anyone who 
expressed an opinion, even one that seemed correct and impartial, could 
legitimately expect to have his sincerity evaluated and his motive for 
expressing his opinion judged. That seems to be the only way, for example, 
to understand the remarks of the well-known Confucian thinker Lo 
Hung-hsien, when in 1547 the Chia-ching emperor released his friend 
and colleague Liu K'uei from six years of physical abuse and imprison-
ment. Liu had protested an imperial construction project, on the grounds 
of insufficient funds. The emperor could not fault the substance of the, 
protest, but he wondered about Liu's motive for making it, and so, 
legitimately, he decided to use cruelty to "test his sincerity". After sub-
jecting him to six years of flogging, shackling, food deprivations, and 
other abuse, the emperor concluded from the reports of his police spies 
that the prisoner was sincere, and so he showed his "sagely benevolence" 
by at last releasing him.17 
The roots of this attitude were planted not by imperial fiat, but by 
the Confucian theoreticians of eastern Chekiang at the time of the Ming 
founding in the 14th century. They believed the mass of activists and 
intellectuals (i.e., "civil society") could not be trusted. Men commonly 
acted and spoke out of self-interest. The horrors of civil war and anarchy 
were proof of that. Few had the general good in mind. China had to 
have a ruler free to act upon his sagely insights into the men's spiritual 
dispositions—a ruler free to make common cause with correct, morally 
upright, and impartial men, and free to ferret out and crush the self-
serving, the deceitful, and the villainous. That was a compelling and 
viscerally powerful attitude, and it continued to inhibit the formation of 
civil society in China long after the Ming dynasty itself passed into 
history. 
17 Lo Hung-hsien, Nien-an wen-chi (Ssu-k'u ch'uan-shu chen-pen ed., 5th ser.), 11.48a-51a. 
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À vrai dire, c'est l'expansion simultanée des pouvoir de l'État 
et des pouvoirs du corps social, et leur interpénétration, qui 
engendrèrent ces concepts. L'enjeu, pour l'État et la société 
civile, fut le contrôle de tout l'espace public formant une 
frontière commune imprécise entre les deux. La société civile, 
en s'appropriant cet espace public où s'affrontèrent les intérêts 
généraux de la nation et les intérêts privés des classes 
montantes (surtout dans le domaine économique - pensons à 
la bourgeoisie des XVIIP et XZX« siècles), requérait 
l'intervention de l'État pour résoudre ses propres 
contradictions internes. L'opposition entre société civile et État 
ne signifia donc nullement séparation ou écart entre les deux, 
mais plutôt symbiose. 
C'est cette conception habermasienne de la société civile qui se 
profile à l'arrière de plusieurs chapitres du présent ouvrage. La 
société civile y apparaît moins comme un objet empirique 
socio-historique à décrire, qu'une méthode heuristique 
permettant de découvrir, d'identifier et de théoriser certains 
aspects parfois moins remarqués de la pensée et de la pratique 
politiques des pays de l'Asie de l'Est. Ce sont peut-être ces 
aspects ombrés qui cachent une part importante des traditions 
profondes de l'Extrême-Orient, gages de développements 
inédits au IIP millénaire. 
PRÉFACE 
In fact, it was the simultaneous expansion of state power and of 
the powers invested in the social body, and their mutual 
interpénétration, which informed these concepts. The stake, 
both for the state and civil society, was the political control of 
all public activity, leading in practice, to a common and blurred 
boundary between the two. Civil society by appropriating this 
public arena where the general interests of the nation and 
private interests of the rising classes met head on (we may 
think of the bourgeoisie of the 17 th and 18th centuries), in fact 
urged state intervention to solve its own internal 
contradictions. The opposition between civil society and the 
state did not therefore imply separation or distance between the 
two, but rather a form of symbiosis. 
We find this habermasian view of civil society in the 
background of many chapters of the present work. The civil 
society appears less as an empirical socio-historical object of 
description than as a heuristic method for the discovery, 
identification and theorizing of certain less noticed aspects of 
the political thought and praxis of East Asian countries. It may 
be precisely these adumbrated aspects which conceal an 
important part of the deep traditions of the Far East, seeds 
perhaps of unexpected developments in the third millenium. 
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